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Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky
Reefer: Arbitration Clauses in Bills of
Lading Under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act
Brandon L. Milhom*
On the first reading of [section 3(8)], it would seem to preclude any possible
loophole through which the carrier could escape or lessen his liability; but
by an examination of the bill in toto .... [Qluite obviously, this clause
really means nothing ....
C.B. Heinemann, Vice President,
Institute of American Meat Packers'
Introduction
The shipping market has historically been characterized by an imbalance
of market power in favor of the carrier.2 Carriers used this market power
to their advantage by placing onerous contractual terms, such as exculpa-
tory clauses, in the bills of lading3 they issued to cargo.4 Attempts have
been made to cure this imbalance of power.5 In the United States, Con-
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1997; B.S. (Econ.), East Tennessee State University,
1994. Special thanks to Michael Sturley, Jon Smith, John Barcel6, Glen Bauer, and Chet
Hooper for their advice and comments throughout the drafting of this Note.
1. Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearings before the Committee on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives, 67th Cong. 75 (1923)
(statement of C. B. Heinemann).
2. For a more complete discussion of the shipping market, see infra Part IV.A.
3. Gilmore and Black define a bill of lading as follows:
A bill of lading is, in the first instance and most simply, an acknowledgment by
a carrier that it has received goods for shipment. Secondly, the bill is a contract
of carriage. Thirdly, if the bill is negotiable (as, for practical purposes, all ocean
bills are) it controls possession of the goods and is one of the indispensable
documents in financing the movement of commodities and merchandise
throughout the world.
GRANT GiLMoRE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 3-1, at 93 (2d ed. 1975).
4. Throughout this Note, "cargo" is personalized and represents cargo interests, or
individuals and others who ship goods by common carrier over water.
5. The history and development of the bill of lading is discussed in more detail
infra Part I.A. See also Daniel E. Murray, History and Development of the Bill of Lading, 37
U. MiAMi L. REv. 689 (1983).
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gress passed the Harter Act 6 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA) 7 to prevent the imposition of contractual terms in bills of lading
that would act to limit carrier liability.8 These acts sought to prevent the
inclusion of terms that cargo would not have accepted in a free market
absent price or non-price concessions from the carrier. International
action was also taken to limit the adhesive nature of bills of lading. The
Hague Rules set forth a framework for the unification of international rules
regarding the content of bills of lading-the framework upon which COGSA
was based.9
Courts in the United States used the statutory provisions in COGSA to
strike down foreign forum choice clauses found in bills of lading as limita-
tions to liability. 10 In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1 a
recent decision resolving a split among the circuit courts, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that COGSA did not compel the invalida-
tion of arbitration clauses found in bills of lading covered by the Act. 12
The Court's holding was less surprising than both the reasoning the Court
used to reach the result and the dicta, part and parcel of that reasoning,
that seemingly limits the continuing viability of the Indussa doctrine. 13
On its face, Sky Reefer is a relatively uncomplicated case that gave spe-
cific commands to the shipping industry. Sky Reefer did not arise in a
vacuum, however. The historical attempt to develop uniform international
laws of shipping and arbitration came under direct scrutiny in Sky Reefer, a
conflict previously dismissed by United States courts. The opinion itself
contains tensions between statutory interpretation and legislative history.
Although the effects of Sky Reefer have not yet surfaced in the shipping
market, United States cargo interests are striving to reestablish the Indussa
doctrine14 through the efforts of the Maritime Law Association.' 5
This Note explores some implications of the Sky Reefer opinion. Part I
details the history of COGSA and examines the common law predating
international unification of the law relating to maritime bills of lading and
the attempt to establish international uniformity in this area. Part II
recounts the U.S. application of COGSA to foreign forum selection and for-
eign arbitration clauses found in bills of lading. Part III chronicles the Sky
6. Harter Act, ch. 105, § 1, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-
196 (1995)).
7. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1995)).
8. See discussion infra Parts LB and l.C.
9. See discussion infra Part I.C.
10. The seminal case on this issue is Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1967) (en banc). This case and its progeny are discussed infra Part II.
11. 115 S. Ct. 2322, 1995 A.M.C. 1817 (1995).
12. See id. at 2325.
13. See discussion infra Part ILA.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. The Maritime Law Association of the United States (MLA), discussed infra note
33, has proposed an "American COGSA" that would strike all jurisdictional clauses in
response to Sky Reefer. For a complete discussion of the MLA proposal, see infra Part
1V.B.
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Reefer decisions, contrasting the First Circuit's holding with the subse-
quent position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court. Part III also surveys the
three opinions submitted by the Supreme Court Justices in Sky Reefer. Part
IV examines the possible economic consequences of Sky Reefer, including
attempts at recodification of the Indussa rule. In conclusion, this Note
determines that Sky Reefer has restored the imbalance of market power in
favor of the carrier, an imbalance that COGSA and the Hague Rules had
attempted to eliminate.
I. The History of COGSA
A. The Common Law Before Unification
Before the United States and other nations16 attempted to codify the duties
of carrier to cargo, those duties were spelled out under the common law.
Although laws varied from country to country, carriers were generally
strictly liable for damage to cargo.17 The two great seafaring nations of the
time, the United States and Great Britain, took similar approaches to the
law. Great Britain held carriers "absolutely responsible for the safety of the
goods while they remained in his hands as carrier."18 Carriers in Britain,
however, were allowed to contract out of liability with express contractual
provisions, and British common law recognized exceptions to strict liabil-
ity such as acts of God, enemy attack, or some "defect or infirmity of the
goods themselves." 19 Similar rules existed in the United States, where
courts had deemed carriers insurers of the goods they were transporting.
Absent legislative provision, acts of God, acts of a public enemy, non-negli-
gent causes, or causes expressly excepted in the bill of lading, the common
carrier would be held completely liable for damaged goods.20
Contractual provisions exculpating carriers from all liability were not
allowed in either Britain or the United States. British carriers were allowed,
in certain circumstances, to limit their liability for negligence or unseawor-
thiness, but only with "absolutely dear, unambiguous, and unequivocal
terms."21 Although U.S. carriers could not contract out of liability for their
negligent actions, federal courts limited the efficacy of this rule by placing
16. In particular, these nations included Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland,
Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark See 2 International Law Association, Preface
to the Report of the 30th Conference iii (Hague Conference 1921), reprinted in 1 THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT AND THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOItes OF THE HAGUE RuLEs 91 (M. Sturley ed., 1990) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
17. See Benjamin W. Yancey, The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby, and
Hamburg, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1238 (1983).
18. Id. at 1238-39.
19. See id. at 1239 (internal quotation marks deleted).
20. See id. For a historical look at the common law of carrier liability, The Propeller
Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7 (1858), is a good starting point. See Yancey, supra note 17,
at 1239 n.5.
21. Id. at 1239. Extremely specific clauses in contracts would allow carriers in Brit-
ain to avoid liability completely for negligent actions of their servants or agents. See 1 T.
CARVER, CARRIAGE BY SEA 124-31 (R. Colinvaux ed., 13th ed. 1982).
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a high burden of proof on cargo.22 If the reason for damage to goods came
within an exception in a bill of lading, cargo was forced to prove that the
carrier's negligence "caused or contributed to the loss."23 Thus, bargaining
power was placed squarely in the hands of carriers. If cargo wanted to ship
goods, they had to accept carrier-imposed bill of lading terms-terms that
judicial activism would not alter regardless of their onerous qualities.
B. The Harter Act (United States)
Given the breadth of the contractual exceptions to liability allowed in both
nations, bills of lading became a mine-field for unsuspecting cargo inter-
ests. 24 Courts only required such clauses to be reasonable-providing little
protection for cargo given the prevailing interpretation of "reasonable."25
Beginning in the 1890's, cargo began a concerted attempt to remedy their
dissatisfaction with the common law.26
In response to the collective cry of cargo, Congress passed the Harter
AcL27 The Harter Act was the result of a compromise between cargo and
carrier. Under the Harter Act, carriers could no longer place clauses in
bills of lading excepting liability for negligence in the "proper loading,
22. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1239-40.
23. Id. at 1239. Given the difficulty of discovery before the implementation of spe-
cific discovery rules, the onus this procedural impediment placed on cargo claimants
proved to be a "very real defensive weapon." Id.
24. On the hidden dangers of exculpatory clauses in bills of lading, J. M. Johnson,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, stated:
[Tlaking advantage of this practical monopoly, the owners of the steamship
lines combined to adopt clauses in their bills of lading, very seriously and
unduly limiting their obligations as carriers of the goods, and refuse to accept
consignments for carriage on any other terms than those dictated by themselves.
That bills of lading have thus become so lengthened, complex, and involved, that
in the ordinary course of business it is almost impossible for shippers of goods
to read or check their various conditions, even if objections would be listened to,
and the hardship aggravated by the fact that new and more stringent conditions
are constantly being added by the shipowners to provide for new questions or
claims that have arisen.
Uniform Ocean Bills of Lading: Hearings Before the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries of the House of Representatives on S. 1152, 74th Cong. 8-9 (1936) (Memoran-
dum on S. 1152, An Act Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea, in letter from J. M.
Johnson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce).
25. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1239-40. Some of the excepting clauses included:
thieves; heat, leakage, and breakage; contact with other goods; perils of the seas;
jettison; damage by seawater; frost; decay; collision; strikes; benefit of insur-
ance; liberty to deviate; sweat and rain; rust; prolongation of the voyage; nonre-
sponsibility for marks or numbers; removal of the goods from the carrier's
custody immediately upon discharge; limitation of value; time for notice of
claims; and time for suit.
Id. at 1240.
Courts had found that all of the above exculpating clauses in a carrier's bill or lading,
in any combination, were reasonable. Further, Yancey notes that the standards of rea-
sonableness were "rather stringent in the carrier's favor." See id.
26. See id. at 1240-41.
27. Harter Act, ch. 105, § 1, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-
196 (1995)).
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stowage, custody, care or proper delivery" of goods28 or "purporting to
reduce the obligation of the owner to exercise due diligence in regard to
seaworthiness,"29 lest they be declared void. In return, cargo could not
hold a carrier liable for losses resulting from "faults or errors in navigation
or in the management" of the vessel if the carrier had used "due diligence"
in keeping the vessel seaworthy.30
The promise that the Harter Act held out for cargo proved to be illu-
sory, however. Carriers were still able to insert clauses limiting the amount
of recovery, requiring strict notice of claims, and calling for short periods
of time to file suit.3 1 Also not affected by the Harter Act was the imposition
upon cargo of the burden to prove otherwise should the loss seem to fall
within one of the exempting clauses in a bill of lading-a burden that
proved just as imposing after Harter as it had been before.32 Although
Congress had attempted to level the bargaining power of cargo and carrier,
the continued existence of burdensome exculpatory clauses strained the
effort.
C. International Uniformity-COGSA and the Hague Rules
In response to the limitations of the Harter Act and calls from the Maritime
Law Association of the United States,33 the Comit6 Maritime Interna-
tional34 (CMI) decided to reexamine the entirety of maritime law in
1912.3 5 In September 1921, the International Law Association, 36 at The
Hague, adopted the rules which the CMI had recommended.37 At the Brus-
sels Convention in August 1924, the International Diplomatic Conference
on Maritime Law signed the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (the Brussels Convention) with
some minor adjustments. 38 National versions of this legislation quickly
28. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1995).
29. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 191 (1995). See also Yancey, supra note 17, at 1241.
30. 46 U.S.C. app. § 192 (1995).
31. Yancey, supra note 17, at 1241.
32. See id. Once again, the burden placed upon cargo in the days prior to the imple-
mentation of the rules of discovery proved too high in many instances-a burden the
Harter Act did not address. See id.
33. The Maritime Law Association of the United States was formed in 1899 for the
purpose of contributing to the efforts of the Comitt Maritime International, discussed
infra note 34. See John C. Moore, The Hamburg Rules, 1 J. MAP L. & CoM. 1, 2 (1978).
34. The CMI was formed in 1897. A conglomerate of several national "Associations
of Maritime Law," the CMI committed itself to creating a uniform international law of
shipping after recognizing that "private agreement would be ineffective." 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 16, at 5. This private law organization has been devoted to the cause
of international uniformity in maritime law since its foundation. See Moore, supra note
33, at 2.
35. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1242.
36. The International Law Association (also known as the Association for the
Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations) was one of the first groups to attempt to
"achieve international uniformity for the law governing bills of lading" and other private
law subjects. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 4.
37. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1242.
38. See id. Other uniform acts have followed. In 1968, the Visby Rules were
amended to the existing Hague Rules. See id. at 1248. The Hamburg Rules represent the
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followed in most major maritime nitions.39 In 1936, the United States
enacted its version of the Brussels Convention, the Carriage of Goods By
Sea Act (COGSA). 40
COGSA covers the relation of cargo to carrier to the extent that a bill of
lading establishes the contract of carriage. 41 Applicable from the time the
goods are loaded until they are discharged, COGSA leaves the Harter Act,
which governs the period before loading and after discharge, otherwise
unchanged.42 COGSA prohibits bill of lading clauses that would act to
relieve a carrier from fault-based liability or to lessen its liability "otherwise
than as provided" in COGSA. 43
Thus, the law of carrier liability has evolved from a regime of strict
liability with exceptions that swallowed the rule to an arrangement wherein
carriers have settled duties to cargo and cannot act to avoid those duties.
Yet COGSA represented more than a mere list of the duties and responsibil-
ities of the carrier; it represented an "allocat[ion of] financial responsibility
for cargo loss or damage that occurs during ocean transportation." 44 The
Hague Rules and COGSA also represented a compromise between cargo
and carrier-a compromise that evened the bargaining power of the two
groups in regard to adhesive, liability limiting clauses in bills of lading.
The ability of carriers to limit their liability indirectly, however, may have
been preserved by Sky Reefer-an ability that was previously limited in the
United States by Indussa and its progeny.
II. Carrier Liability: Indussa and Its Progeny
A. Forum Choice Agreements Before Indussa
COGSA section 3(8) provides:
Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with
the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties of obliga-
tions provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as
provided in this Act, shall be null and void and of no effect. 45
most recent attempt at international uniformity in maritime law. The Hamburg Rules
show remarkable variance from Hague/Visby in the areas of liability and package limita-
tion-changes that could cause problems in the areas of insurance and conflict of laws.
See Moore, supra note 33, at 11.
39. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1242. The quickest response was from the British
Empire. Other nations waited until the United States enacted a version of the Brussels
Convention in 1936 before adopting the rules as their own national law. See 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HisroRY, supra note 15, at 15, 23.
40. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified at
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1995)).
41. See Yancey, supra note 17, at 1243.
42. See id. at 1244.
43. See Alan Nakazawa & B. Alexander Moghaddam, COGSA and Choice of Foreign
Law Clauses in Bills of Lading, 17 Ma LAw 1, 3 (1992).
44. Maritime Law Association of the United States, Revising the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, May 3, 1996, at 8 (Doc. No. 724, Committee on the Carriage of Goods) [herein-
after Revising COGSA].
45. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1936) (emphasis added).
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Courts in both England and France had upheld forum choice clauses
under a similar section of the Hague Rules.46 In The Fehmarn,47 a British
court invalidated a forum choice clause, stating that the clauses were prima
facie valid, but enforceable at the discretion of the courts.48 The Fehmarn
court also established guidelines, such as justice and propriety, for deter-
mining when the clauses should be enforced.49 By contrast, French courts
have upheld forum choice clauses regardless of their potential effect on the
outcome of litigation.50
Initially, United States courts split over the enforceability of foreign
forum selection clauses in bills of lading covered by COGSA. The Fifth
Circuit, in Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, strictly construed a
forum selection clause and held that the clause did not limit the court's
ability to exercise in rem jurisdiction.51 The court disregarded the plain-
tiff's argument that the clause ran afoul of COGSA section 3(8),52 instead
basing its decision on the principle that agreements ousting courts ofjuris-
diction are contrary to public policy.53 The Second Circuit faced the sec-
tion 3(8) issue for the first time in 1955.
In Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, the Second Circuit
enforced a foreign forum selection clause because it was reasonable. 54 A
jurisdictional clause contained in the defendant's bill of lading called for
all claims to be decided in Swedish courts.55 The plaintiff argued that the
clause ran afoul of COGSA section 3(8) because of the additional expense
that a plaintiff would be forced to undertake in order to bring suit in a
46. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, T.S. No. 931, 22, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, 165 (Hague Rules).
47. [1957] Lloyd's List L. Rep. 511.
48. See id. at 514.
49. See id. See also WILL.IA Tamay, MARINE CARGO CLAIMS 1100 (3d ed. 1988).
"Jurisdiction clauses are valid except insofar as, in respect of a bill of lading to which the
Hague/Visby Rules apply, they purport to select a forum which would apply a lesser
liability of the carrier than the Visby Rules provide. . ... " Id. See also The El Amria
[1981] 2 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 119, 123-24.
50. See TEnEY, supra note 49, at 1035 ("Under French law, jurisdiction clauses are
valid... the French judge not being expected to concern himself about how a foreign
court may render judgment.").
51. 254 F.2d 297, 300-301 (5th Cir. 1958). The clause at issue in S.S. Monrosa
stated,
[N]o legal proceedings may be brought against the Captain or ship owners or
their agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any goods herein specified,
except in Genoa, it being understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in the
place or places where the goods were shipped or landed is incompetent, notwith-
standing that the ship may be legally represented there.
Id. at 299.
52. See Brief of Appellant at 13-17, Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254
F.2d 297 (No. 16,667). The argument was persuasive enough to merit an in depth
response from the appellees. See Brief of Appellees at 15-18, S.S. Monrosa (No. 16,667).
53. See S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d at 300-301. The court failed to list even the § 3(8)
issue in its summary of the grounds for appeal. See id. at 299 n.3.
54. See 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955), overruled by
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc).
55. See id. at 807.
Cornell International Law Journal
foreign jurisdiction.56 The court summarily rejected the argument,
explaining that costs "incidental to the process of litigation" did not come
under the auspices of section 3(8).5 7 The court instead held that jurisdic-
tional clauses should be enforced if they were found to be reasonable. 58
Thus, United States courts split on the validity of foreign forum choice
clauses by applying general legal principles while avoiding the issue of
whether or not section 3(8) precluded that enforceability.
International uniformity was not the primary concern for the U.S.
courts when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed its own prece-
dent in 1967 and held forum choice clauses invalid under section 3(8) of
COGSA. That American courts would refuse to enforce a forum choice
clause was really no surprise. As one commentator had written, "[W]ith
almost boring unanimity American courts have refused to enforce contrac-
tual provisions conferring exclusive jurisdiction in advance on a court or
courts of a particular sister state or foreign country."59 As the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Win. H. Muller showed, the doctrine of ouster appeared to
be losing force in the admiralty context-until Indussa.
B. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg
Indussa contracted with a Belgian agency to ship nails and barbed wire
from Belgium to the United States on board the S.S. Ranborg.60 In the bill
of lading issued to Indussa, a clause entitled "Jurisdiction" required all
claims to be brought in the carrier's principal place of business, and under
Norwegian law.6 1 Indussa filed suit in the Southern District of New York
in order to recover $2600 for damage caused by rust.62 Based on the juris-
dictional clause found in the bill of lading, the district court determined
that it had no jurisdiction.63 Rejecting the district court's determination,
the court of appeals reasoned that such a clause placed a "high hurdle" in
the way of cargo's pursuit of its claim.64
Two arguments seemed to convince the Second Circuit that the district
court could properly assert jurisdiction over the dispute. Initially, the
court of appeals worried that a foreign tribunal would not apply COGSA or
the Hague Rules to a claim and, even if it did, the tribunal's application of
those rules might not be the same as an American court's. Even though
Norway was a signatory to the Brussels Convention and the Norwegian law
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 808.
59. Note, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts,
10 LA. L. REv. 293, 293 (1950).
60. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc).
61. The clause at issue provided, "Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall
be decided in the country where the carrier has his principal place of business, and the
law of such country shall apply except as provided elsewhere herein." Id. at 201.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 200-01.
64. See id. at 203-04.
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to be applied to Indussa's claim was similar to COGSA,65 the court refused
to subject cargo with goods in transit "to or from ports of the United
States"66 to different nations' interpretations of COGSA. 67 The court inter-
preted COGSA as evidencing an intent to subject shipments to or from
American ports to American courts' interpretations of COGSA, regardless
of the state of the law of the country under whose jurisdiction the bill of
lading required litigation.68
The court also stated that "[s]uch a clause puts a high hurdle in the
way of enforcing liability.., and thus is an effective means for carriers to
secure settlements lower than if cargo could sue in a convenient forum." 6 9
Thus, the Indussa court reasoned that a shipper may be less willing to pros-
ecute a claim and more -willing to accept a settlement below the true value
of his claim if forced to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction. 70 In addition, the
court again interpreted COGSA as evidencing Congressional intent to
"invalidate any contractual provision in a bill of lading for a shipment to or
from the United States that would prevent cargo able to obtain jurisdiction
over a carrier in an American court from having that court entertain the
suit and apply the substantive rules Congress had prescribed."71 Thus, the
Second Circuit was in fact troubled about the application of any law,
regardless of its relation to COGSA, to a claim that was "properly before
[an American court]." 72
The Indussa court's opinion did not sweep as broadly as it might have,
however. The court limited the ruling in dicta: "Our ruling does not touch
the question of arbitration clauses in bills of lading which require [arbitra-
tion] to be held abroad." 73 The court asserted that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)74 by its own terms "validated a written arbitration provision in
65. See id. at 201.
66. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 (1936).
67. See Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 203-04.
70. See id. at 203.
71. Id. at 204.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 204 n.4.
74. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes a written agreement to arbitrate in any
maritime transaction "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1947). The FAA expressly includes "bills of lading of water carriers" within
its scope. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947). The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as evi-
dencing a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court noted, "The preeminent concern of Con-
gress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, a concern which requires ... [rigorous enforcement of] agreements to arbi-
trate." 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985).
Congress reaffirmed its commitment to international arbitration agreements in 1970
when it passed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq.). The Convention establishes procedures for compelling arbitration and for enforc-
ing arbitral awards based on agreements to arbitrate between international parties. See 9
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
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any maritime transaction... includ[ing] bills of lading of water carriers."75
Thus, the court, while holding foreign forum choice clauses invalid per se,
refused to do the same for foreign arbitration agreements.
The Supreme Court did not completely agree with the Indussa court's
reasoning. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,76 the Supreme Court
held that foreign forum selection clauses should be upheld as a matter of
course unless the resisting party could prove that the clause was unreason-
able under the circumstances. 77 Zapata contracted with Unterweser,
owner of The Bremen, to tow a drilling rig from the United States to Italy
after soliciting bids for the service.78 The contract, subject to extensive
negotiation and revision, contained a forum selection clause calling for dis-
putes to be litigated before the London Court of Justice. 79 Zapata did not
attempt to revise the jurisdiction clause, and the contract was accepted
with the clause intact 80 When the drilling rig was damaged in transit,
Zapata brought suit in U.S. district court to recover damages. The district
court refused to enforce the forum choice clause, and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.81 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a split in the circuits regarding the validity of foreign forum choice
clauses in international towage contracts.8 2
The Court carefully differentiated The Bremen from Indussa in several
aspects, particularly in that the jurisdictional clause arose in a towage con-
tract and not a bill of lading under the auspices of COGSA. However, the
reasoning of The Bremen seemed broad enough to defeat the Second Cir-
cuit's Indussa holding. The heart of the opinion concerned the enforce-
ment of contracts freely made between "experienced and sophisticated
businessmen."83 The Court also worried about the economic impact a
decision invalidating a forum choice clause would have on American busi-
nesses participating in international trade.84 Thus, the Supreme Court
began undercutting the applicability of Indussa a mere five years after the
decision.
Yet the Second Circuit's decision in Indussa continued to show vitality,
and despite the Supreme Court's reasoning in The Bremen, other circuits
75. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204 n.4 (internal quotation marks deleted). The court cited
the FAA in support of its reasoning. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the FAA, see
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
76. 407 U.S. 1, 1972 A.M.C. 1407 (1972).
77. See id. at 15.
78. See id. at 2-3.
79. See id. at 4.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 4-11.
82. See id. at 2.
83. Id. at 11-12. The Bremen Court stated: "The choice of that forum was made in
an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen ... and ... it
should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts." Id. at 12 (emphasis
added).
84. See id. at 9. "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts." Id.
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uniformly invalidated foreign forum selection clauses under COGSA sec-
tion 3(8).85 In Union Insurance Society of Canton v. S.S. Elikon,8 6 the
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce a forum choice clause that would have
vested exclusive jurisdiction in West German courts and called for the
application of West German laws. Finding the intent of Congress in
COGSA as "suggest[ing] a preference for an American forum," 87 the court
relied heavily on the reasoning of Indussa. As recently as 1987, the Fifth
Circuit in Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose held a Finnish forum
selection clause void, citing concerns that a carrier's liability may be less-
ened in a foreign tribunal applying law other than COGSA.88
C. The Final Blow to Indussa
The S.S. Elikon court distinguished The Bremen in two ways. Initially, it
noted that The Bremen Court had not been faced with a "pre-printed form
bill[ ] of lading," but rather a bill of lading that had been accepted only
after solicitation of bids and a negotiation with the owner of the vessel.8 9
The S.S. Elikon court also noted that the Supreme Court in The Bremen had
heard and decided the case in the absence of "congressional policy," which
COGSA brought into play in Indussa, S.S. Elikon, and M/V Finnrose.90 The
S.S. Elikon court noted that the passage of COGSA demonstrated an
"explicit congressional concern[ ] about bills of lading in foreign trade."91
As evidence of this "explicit" concern, the court stated that COGSA was
passed in order to "reduce uncertainty concerning the responsibilities and
liabilities of carriers, the responsibilities and rights of shippers and the
liabilities of underwriters," factors not implicated in an arm's length agree-
85. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A., v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326
(1995). The Court, citing GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 3-25, at 145-46 n.23, went
on to point out that commentators have also approved of the Indussa rule. See Sky
Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326.
86. 642 F.2d 721, 1982 A.M.C. 588 (4th Cir. 1981). In S.S. Elikon, Union Insurance
paid its insured, General Electric (G.E.), for damage occasioned to G.E.'s goods while in
transit from the United States to Kuwait. The carrier, Hansa, had issued two bills of
lading to G.E. evidencing receipt of the goods on board the S.S. Elikon. Union Insurance
brought suit as the subrogee to G.E.'s claim in United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia. The jurisdiction clause in the bills of lading stated, "All actions
under this contract shall be brought before the Court of the Bremen, Federal Republic of
Germany and the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany shall apply." Id. at 722 n.1.
87. Id. at 726.
88. See 826 F.2d 1441, 1443-44, 1988 A.M.C. 318 (5th Cir. 1987). Conklin & Gar-
rett contracted to ship a merry-go-round from the United Kingdom to the United States
on board the M/V Finnrose, a vessel chartered by Atlantic Cargo Services. The bill of
lading contained a jurisdictional clause calling for litigation in Finland under Finnish
law. When the merry-go-round was damaged in transit, Conklin & Garrett brought suit
in United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See id. at 1441.
89. See S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d at 724. See also Nakazawa and Moghaddam, supra note
43, at 8.
90. See S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d at 724. The Bremen Court had explicitly distinguished
Indussa due to the inapplicability of COGSA to the towage contract, and thus the Fourth
Circuit could readily distinguish The Bremen from S.S. Elikon. See Nakazawa and
Moghaddam, supra note 43, at 8.
91. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
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ment between two parties as in The Bremen.92 As the S.S. Elikon decision
showed, The Bremen was not considered strong enough to overcome a
broad interpretation of COGSA, the basis of Indussa's holding.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of forum selection clauses in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,93 finally bringing Indussa and its prog-
eny to the breaking point. Shute, a Washington resident, was injured while
on board The Tropicale, a vessel owned by Carnival Cruise Lines.9 4 The
ticket purchased by Shute contained a provision placing jurisdiction in "a
Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts
of any other state or country."95 Shute filed suit in United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington.
96
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court considered whether the Limitation
of Vessel Owner's Liability Act 9 7 invalidated the forum selection clause
found in the cruise line ticket.9 8 The pertinent section of the Act, section
183c, stated:
It shall be unlawful for the... owner of any vessel transporting passengers
between ports of the United States or between any such port and a foreign
port to insert in any rule, regulation, contract, or agreement any provision or
limitation (1) purporting ... to relieve such owner... from liability . . . for
... loss or injury, or (2) purporting in such event to lessen, weaken, or avoid
the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction on the
question of liability .... All such provisions or limitations contained in any
such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are.., null and void and of no
effect.9 9
Strictly construing the language contained in section 183c, which is analo-
gous to COGSA section 3(8), 100 the Court refused to find that the clause in
92. See id.
93. 499 U.S. 585, 1991 A.M.C. 1697 (1991).
94. See id. at 588.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, ch. 521, 49 Stat. 1480 (1936) (codi-
fied at 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1995)).
98. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 590. The Limitation of Vessel Owner's
Liability Act was passed "in response to passenger-ticket conditions purporting to limit
the shipowner's liability for negligence or to remove the issue of liability from the scru-
tiny of any court by means of [an arbitration clause]." Id. at 596 (citing S. REPT. No. 74-
2061, at 6 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 74-2517, at 6 (1936)). The reasons behind the Limita-
tion of Vessel Owner's Liability Act were similar to the rationale undergirding COGSA.
For a discussion of the rationale underlying COGSA, see supra Part I.A.
99. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1995) (emphasis added).
100. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c. The similarity of the two sections is readily apparent.
COGSA § 3(8) provides:
Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier
or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods
... or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this Chapter, shall be
null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1995) (emphasis added).
The dissenters in Carnival Cruise Lines, Justices Stevens and Marshall, pointed out the
similarity in the two clauses: "The Courts of Appeals, construing an analogous provi-
sion of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act... have unanimously held invalid as limita-
tions on liability forum-selection clauses requiring suit in foreign jurisdictions."
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the ticket "lessen[ed], weaken[ed], or avoid[ed] the right of any claimant to
a trial by court of competent jurisdiction."10 1
Applying reasoning similar to that of The Bremen Court, the Carnival
Cruise Lines Court determined that the clause at issue was indeed reason-
able. 102 Citing the need for certainty, the judicial efficiency of forum
choice clauses, and subsequent savings to passengers, the Court held the
clause enforceable. 10 3 Further, the Court noted that no facts were available
on the record that would sustain the "heavy burden of proof' required to
invalidate an otherwise valid jurisdictional clause. 10 4
III. Forum Choice, Arbitration, and Sky Reefer
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MAV Sky Reefer, the arbitration clause in
dispute arose from a "standard form bill of lading" for a shipment of
fruit.10 5 Bacchus Associates (Bacchus) contacted a Moroccan supplier,
Galaxie Negoce, S.A. (Galaxie), to purchase the fruit. Bacchus voyage-
chartered the M/V Sky Reefer from Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
(Nichiro) 10 6 to transport the fruit from Morocco to Massachusetts. After
Galaxie loaded the fruit, a bill of lading was issued to Galaxie, as shipper
and consignee, by Nichiro, as carrier. In order to finalize the transaction,
Galaxie then transferred the bill of lading to Bacchus based on a letter of
credit posted in Galaxie's favor.107
When a portion of the fruit was damaged in transit, Bacchus suffered
over one million dollars in damages.10 8 Bacchus received compensation
for the loss from its marine cargo insurer, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros
(Vimar Seguros). Bacchus and Vimar Seguros then commenced suit in
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the
owner of the vessel, M.H. Maritima, in personam, and against the M/V Sky
Reefer in rem.109 The defendants moved for a stay of the actions and for
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 603-04. They would have applied Indussa type reason-
ing in order to invalidate the clause in question. See id.
101. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c. The Court held that the only limitation that section 183c
established was that a clause may not both deprive all "competent" courts of jurisdiction
and limit an owner's liability for negligence. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 596-
97.
102. See id. at 593-595.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 595. The Court avoided what may have been the plaintiffs' best argu-
ment, that they were "financially incapable of pursuing [the] litigation in [the contrac-
tual forum]," by holding that the court of appeals had not included enough information
in the record for the Court to "validate the finding of inconvenience." See id. at 594.
105. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
106. Nichiro had time-chartered the vessel from M.H. Maritima, S.A., through Honma
Senpaku Co., Ltd. See id.
107. A letter of credit posted in the shipper's name gives "assurance to the [shipper] of
prompt payment upon [delivery] without the [shippers] having to rely upon the solvency
and good faith of the buyer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 904 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Lus-
trelon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 428 A.2d 518, 523 (NJ. Super. 1981)).
108. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
109. In personam jurisdiction is used when seeking "judgment against a person
involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person." BLAcK's LAW
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specific enforcement of the arbitration agreement found in the bill of lad-
ing under section 3 of the FAA. 110 The clause called for arbitration in
Japan.
The district court halted the proceedings and issued an order compel-
ling the petitioners to arbitrate, while retaining jurisdiction pending arbi-
tration.111 On interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the order. In
order to resolve a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to examine the enforceability of foreign arbitration clauses in mari-
time bills of lading.112
Although seemingly a simple dispute that could be easily resolved by
applying simple contract law, the application of domestic statutes, interna-
tional treaties, and prior holdings of United States federal courts on related
issues make Sky Reefer a case of particular import to the shipping industry.
In fact, the district court quickly dismissed the simple contract argument
that the bill of lading constituted a contract of adhesion because Bacchus
was "a sophisticated party familiar with the negotiation of maritime ship-
ping transactions.""13 Thus, the only argument left for the petitioners was
that arbitration clauses in bills of lading, otherwise enforceable under the
FAA, were not enforceable because the clauses ran afoul of COGSA. 114
A. The First Circuit's Sky Reefer
The interplay of arbitration clauses and bills of lading posed a problem
previously unadressed by the First Circuit. Although forum selection
clauses had been universally rejected under COGSA, 115 a rejection widely
supported by commentators,1 16 the Indussa court had avoided the particu-
DIcrIoNARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). In rem jurisdiction "[r]efers to an action that is taken
directly against the defendant's property .... Power over a thing possessed by a court
which allows it to seize and hold the object for some legal purpose." Id. at 794.
In order to secure payment of a potential liability for the damaged goods, plaintiffs
who have received damaged goods proceed against the vessel in rem. When the proceed-
ing is instituted, the vessel is arrested in the port at which it is served. The owner of the
vessel may then be allowed to post a security to cover potential liabilities, thus freeing
the vessel from the port so that it may continue carrying goods. In this manner, the
plaintiffs potential recovery is insured against a defendant whose assets may not other-
wise be able to cover the potential liability. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, § 9-89 at
796-97; TErLEY, supra note 49, at 795.
110. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325. The FAA is discussed in greater detail supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
111. See Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. at 2325-26.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 2325.
114. See id. at 2326.
115. By contrast, the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines had enforced a forum
selection clause over language in the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act similar to
that found in COGSA. For a discussion of Carnival Cruise Lines, see supra Part ll.B.
116. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 729-30 (1st Cir.
1994). The court cited an impressive list of cases and articles including Conklin & Gar-
rett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1987), and Union Insurance
Society of Canton v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 726 (4th Cir. 1981), as decisions support-
ing the invalidation of forum choice clauses under COGSA. The court also cited the
following commentators as supporting the Indussa rule: GILMORE & BLAcK, supra note 3,
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lar question. As the Indussa court explained in a footnote, "Our ruling
does not touch the question of arbitration clauses in bills of lading which
require [arbitration] to be held abroad."117 The Indussa court noted in
passing, however, that the FAA expressly covered arbitration clauses "in
any maritime transaction" including "bills of lading of water carriers."118
After Indussa, courts split on the validity of arbitration clauses in bills
of lading governed by COGSA. 119 A particularly notable decision invali-
dating an arbitration clause was handed down by the Eleventh Circuit. In
State Establishment for Agricultural Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde,120
the court, borrowing the reasoning of Indussa, invalidated an arbitration
clause that called for London-based arbitration. 121 Given the existence of
the FAA, the court did not hold the clause invalid per se; however, the court
would have required express agreement between shipper and carrier before
enforcing the arbitration clause. 122 When Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v.
M/V Sky Reefer came to the First Circuit, the members of that court were
finally confronted with the divisive issue of arbitration clauses covered by
COGSA.123
§ 3-25 at 145; THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMmALTY & MArnME LAw § 9-18 at 326-27
(Prac. ed. 1987); Charles L. Black, The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting
Interpretation, 6 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 365, 368-69 (1973).
117. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 204 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967). Further,
the Indussa court stated, "The validity of such a clause in a charter party, or in a bill of
lading effectively incorporating such a clause in a charter party, has been frequently
sustained." Id.
118. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947)). The court maintained that any conflict between
the two statutes should be resolved in favor of the FAA, which was enacted subsequent
to COGSA. See id.
119. See Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at 731. Several courts invalidated the clauses. See, e.g.,
State Establishment of Agric. Prod. Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576, 1988
A.M.C. 2328 (11th Cir. 1988) (invalid); Organes Enters., Inc. v. MNV Khalij Frost, 1989
A.M.C. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.) (invalid); Siderius, Inc. v. M.V. Ida Prima, 613 F. Supp. 916
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (invalid); Pacific Lumber & Shipping Co. v. Star Shipping A/S, 464 F.
Supp. 1314 (W.D. Wash. 1979) (invalid). But see, e.g., Nissho Iwai Amer. Corp. v. M/V
Sea Bridge, 1991 A.M.C. 2070 (D. Md.); Citrus Mktg. Bd. v. M/V Ecuadorian Reefer, 754
F. Supp. 229, 1991 A.M.C. 1042 (D. Mass. 1990); Travelers Indem., Co. v. M/V Mediter-
ranean Star, 1988 A.M.C. 2483 (S.D.N.Y.); Mid South Feeds, Inc. v. M/V Aqua Marine,
1988 A.M.C. 437 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Midland Tar Distillers, Inc. v. M/T Lotos, 362 F. Supp.
1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. M/S Galini, 323 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Kurt Orban Co. v. S/S Clymenia, 318 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
120. 838 F.2d 1576, 1988 A.M.C. 2328 (11th Cir. 1988). State Establishment con-
tracted with the owners and charterers of the M/V Wesermunde in order transport a
shipment of eggs from the United States to Jordan. The charter party, incorporated into
the bill of lading, contained a clause referring disputes to arbitration in London accord-
ing to the "Arbitration Act." The eggs were destroyed by fire before they could be off-
loaded in Jordan, and State Establishment commenced suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida to recover for the loss. See id. at 1578.
121. The clause stated, "[A]ny dispute arising under this charter party [is] to be set-
tled by arbitration in London ... according to the Arbitration Act." Id. at 1578.
122. See id. at 1581-82. The court would have required actual notice and/or express
agreement over the arbitration clause; however, the court did show some propensity to
hold the clause per se invalid as an illegitimate limitation of the carrier's liability under
COGSA § 3(8). See id. at 1580-81.
123. See discussion supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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Relying heavily on two canons of statutory construction and assuming
a conflict between the two statutes, the court found that the FAA rather
than COGSA controlled the enforceability of arbitration clauses. 124 The
first canon used by the court was, "a later enacted statute generally limits
the scope of an earlier statute if the two laws conflict;"' 2 ' therefore, the
court reasoned that the FAA (1947) would control as opposed to COGSA
(1936). The second canon cited stated, "where two statutes conflict,
regardless of the priority of enactment, the specific statute ordinarily con-
trols the general."126 The second canon operated to validate the clause
because the FAA speaks specifically to arbitration, and even more specifi-
cally to arbitration in bills of lading,127 whereas COGSA merely voids any
clause that limits a carrier's liability,128 without any specific "reference to
arbitration, or for that matter, forum selection clauses."
129
The First Circuit was cautious in Sky Reefer, avoiding broadly sweep-
ing language and possible conflicts with Indussa.130 The court noted fur-
ther, "We recognize, however, that absent the FAA, COGSA might operate
to nullify foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading."' 31 The court also
noted that a foreign arbitration agreement did not "deprive the federal
court of its jurisdiction over the underlying dispute."'132 Finally, the court
found that the "strong federal policy favoring arbitration supports the pri-
macy of the FAA over COGSA where arbitration agreements are con-
cerned." 133 This primacy resulted from the fact that foreign forum choice
clauses were distinguishable from arbitration clauses because "there was
no compelling congressional mandate in favor of giving effect to agree-
ments to litigate before foreign tribunals."1 34 The Supreme Court decided
that the First Circuit's scalpel cut too finely, and substituted a chain saw.
124. See Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at 732.
125. Id. at 732. COGSA was enacted in 1936. The FAA was reenacted in 1947. See
id. Although the FAA was originally enacted in 1925, it was recodified as positive law in
1947. See Indussa v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 204 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967). Although the
inaccurate use of the enacting dates of COGSA and the FAA would seem to contradict
the First Circuit's reasoning, the subsequent dismissal of the First Circuit's interpretive
arguments by the Supreme Court makes this argument moot. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct.
at 2326.
126. Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at 732. The First Circuit assumed the existence of a conflict
between the two statutes. See id. at 730.
127. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
128. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1995).
129. Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at 732.
130. See id. The court did, however, state that the reasoning underlying Indussa was
beginning to fade, citing authority for this proposition in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985). See Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at
732 ("We are 'well past the time when judicial suspicion of... arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alterna-
tive means of dispute resolution.'").
131. Id. at 732 n.5.
132. Id. at 733.
133. Id. at 732. For a discussion regarding the "strong federal policy" implications of
the FAA, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
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B. The Supreme Court's Sky Reefer 13 '
The Court dealt quickly with the First Circuit's holding that COGSA and
the FAA conflicted on the point at issue.13 6 Justice Kennedy stated that
COGSA would have to nullify the arbitration agreement on its own terms
for a conflict to exist.137 The majority then proceeded to dismantle
Indussa. Finding that transaction costs do not act to "lessen liability"
under COGSA section 3(8), the Court, strictly construing the statute, held:
The liability that may not be lessened is liability for loss or damage ...
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or obligations provided
in this section. The statute thus addresses the lessening of the specific liability
imposed by the act, without addressing the separate question of the means and
costs of enforcing that liability.138
The Court further noted that COGSA was enacted in order to correct "spe-
cific abuses by carriers," and, in so doing, set forth "explicit standards of
conduct."'139 "Nothing," the Court explained, "in this section... suggests
that the statute prevents the parties from agreeing to enforce these obliga-
tions in a particular forum."140 In support of its statutory interpretation,
the Court cited its opinion in Carnival Cruise Lines. 141
Two other grounds seemed to sway the Court's opinion regarding the
correct interpretation of COGSA. First, the Court attacked the argument
that transaction costs are necessarily increased when parties are forced to
arbitrate in a foreign tribunal. 142 The Court stated, "Requiring a Seattle
cargo owner to arbitrate in New York likely imposes more costs and bur-
dens than a foreign arbitration clause requiring it to arbitrate in Vancou-
ver."14 3 The Court also pointed to other nations' interpretations of the
Hague Rules, upon which COGSA is based, and noted, "Sixty-six countries
... are now parties to [the Brussels Convention], and it appears that none
has interpreted its enactment of section 3(8) of the Hague Rules to prohibit
135. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 1995 A.M.C.
1817 (1995). It is important to note at the outset that only eight justices heard the case,
Justice Breyer having recused himself. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, and in order
to craft a majority opinion, artfully avoided any use of COGSA's legislative history. In so
doing, he avoided a probable concurrence from Justices Scalia and Thomas, set up a
binding majority opinion holding that COGSA does not nullify a foreign arbitration
clause, and included dicta broad enough to implicate Indussa. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct.
at 2324.
136. See id. at 2326. The Court noted, "W]hen two statutes are capable of coexis-
tence.., it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention
to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974)) (internal citations omitted).
137. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326.
138. See id. at 2327 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. For a discussion of Carnival Cruise Lines, see supra Part II.B.
142. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court noted, "Even if it were reasonable
to read § 3(8) to make a distinction based on travel time, airfare, and hotel bills, these
factors are not susceptible of a simple and enforceable distinction between domestic and
foreign forums." Id.
143. Id. at 2327-28.
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foreign forum selection clauses." 144 Because "conflicts in the interpreta-
tion of the Hague Rules not only destroy aesthetic symmetry in the interna-
tional legal order but impose real costs on the commercial system in
[which] the Rules govem," the Court rejected Indussa's interpretation of
COGSA.14 5
Reasons of comity also compelled the Court's decision. Citing The
Bremen, the Court stated that the "historical judicial resistance to foreign
forum selection clauses, has little place in an era when.., businesses once
essentially local now operate in world markets."14 6 Uniformity in the mar-
ket place and a refusal to "insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts,"147 reasoned the
Court, is the best manner in which to insure American expansion into
international markets. 14 8 The Court found further support in the FAA.
The Court stated that the FAA was "intended to encourage the recognition
and enforcement of commercial arbitral agreements in international con-
tracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed... and enforced," and that courts should therefore avoid a con-
struction of "domestic legislation" that would limit the effectiveness of
these international agreements.
149
The Court's most controversial reasoning concerned the plaintiffs'
claim that a foreign arbitrator may either apply COGSA incorrectly or not
apply it at all. In a careful maneuver, the Court refused to pass judgment
on the question, deeming the issue premature for this proceeding, which
was predicated merely upon the enforcement of the arbitration clause.150
Justice Kennedy reasoned, "[M]ere speculation that the foreign arbitrators
might apply Japanese law which, depending on the proper construction of
COGSA, might reduce [the carrier's] legal obligations, does not in and of
itself lessen liability under COGSA section 3(8)."1'5 This reasoning was
girded by the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction for enforcement
of the arbitral award, at which time the court could question the adequacy
of the law applied as against public policy, if necessary.'
5 2
144. Id. at 2328 (citing Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in the National
Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA.J. lTr'L L. 729,
776-96 (1987)).
145. See id. (citing Sturley, International Uniform Laws, supra note 144, at 736). The
Indussa court had read COGSA as preferring the application of American law in Ameri-
can courts to all claims that dealt with the transport of goods to or from American ports.
See supra Part II.A.
146. Id. (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (internal
quotation marks deleted)).
147. See id. (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 2329 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974)
(emphasis added)).
150. See id. at 2330.
151. Id.
152. See id. In support of its holding, the Court cites Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), where it stated that "the choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies .... [Wie would have little hesitation in condemning the
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Of particular note in the Sky Reefer majority is Justice Kennedy's fail-.
ure to cite any legislative history regarding section 3(8) of COGSA153-1eg-
islative history that would have added support to the enforcement of the
clause.154 Congress left forum selection clauses out of the Harter Act, even
though cargo voiced concerns regarding the clauses.155 Furthermore,
domestic legislation in other countries had invalidated foreign forum
choice clauses.' 5 6 Nevertheless, the delegates to the London Conference of
the CMI refused to include a clause invalidating forum selection clauses in
the Hague Rules.' 5 7 The reason for this refusal was eloquently stated by
then president of the CMI, Louis Franclc
Then I hear that it has been suggested that we should increase the burden of
the proposed Convention and of the Rules and include such matters as juris-
diction in it .... It may be an abundant source of litigation, but really it is
not business. But surely this is not a system or a problem which only arises
agreement as against public policy." Id. at 637 n.19. However, arbitral awards have
only been overturned in this country when they are deemed to be in "manifest disregard
of the law," San Maritine Compania de Nay. v. Saguenay Terminals, 293 F.2d 796, 801
(9th Cir. 1961), or are "contrary to well accepted and deep rooted public policy," Sea
Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor B.V., 574 F. Supp. 367, 372, 1984
A.M.C. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a standard that, according to two authors, is rarely if ever
met. See Robert Force and Anthony J. Mavronicolas, Two Models of Maritime Dispute
Resolution: Litigation and Arbitration, 65 Tu_. L. REv. 1461, 1506 n.142, 1507 n.145,
1508 n.152 (1991). See also Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
foreign-law clauses leave the shipper who does pursue his claim open to the application
of unfamiliar and potentially disadvantageous legal standards, until he can obtain
review (perhaps years later) in a domestic forum under the high standard applicable to
vacation of arbitration awards." (emphasis added)).
153. For a discussion of possible reasons for the absence of legislative history injus-
tice Kennedy's opinion, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
154. Because the goal of Congress in enacting COGSA was to give effect to the Brus-
sels Convention and because of the similarity between the text of section 3(8) of COGSA
and the Hague Rules, the legislative history of both is fittingly considered in determining
the breadth of the provision in regard to forum choice clauses. See Michael F. Sturley,
Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses Under Section 3(8) of the U.S. Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act: Statutory Intent and Judicial Interpretation 25 (January 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author at the University of Texas Law School)
[hereinafter Statutory Intent].
155. H.R. REP. No. 52-1988, at 2 (1892); 24 CoNG. REc. 172 (1892) (statement of Rep.
Coombs).
156. Sea-Carriage of Goods Act, 1904, No. 14, § 6 (Austl.) (invalidating forum selec-
tion clauses in bills of lading); Shipping and Seaman Amendment Act, 1911, 2 Geo. 5,
No. 37, § 9 (N.Z.) (invalidating forum selection clauses in bills of lading); Code de Com-
merce Maritime, art. 264 (Morocco, French Zone, Mar. 31, 1919), in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 16, at 8 (invalidating forum selection clauses in bills of lading); Water
Carriage of Goods Act 1910, 9-10 Edw. 7, ch. 61, § 5 (Can.) (invalidating forum selec-
tion clauses in bills of lading). See also discussion at I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
16, at 7-8.
The Canadian Act is of particular import because it was used as the "principal model"
for the Hague Rules. See Statutory Intent, supra note 154, at 27. See also 2 International
Law Association, Report of the 30th Conference 160 (Hague Conference 1921),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 266.
157. At the London Conference of the CMI, the delegates finalized the draft of the
Hague Rules that was submitted at the Brussels Conference and later adopted as the
Brussels Convention. See Michael F. Sturley, The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules,
22 J. MAm L. & CoM. 1, 27-28 (1991).
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about the negligence clauses and we cannot bring it in here. 158
Thus, the inclusion of a section regarding forum selection clauses was spe-
cifically considered and dismissed by the drafters of the Brussels Conven-
tion-the model for COGSA.
In drafting COGSA, Congress was also directly confronted with the
issue of forum choice clauses. Several bills introduced while Congress was
considering the manner in which it would enact the Hague Rules contained
provisions that would have invalidated forum choice clauses.1 5 9 In hear-
ings on COGSA, the issue of forum selection clauses was presented once
again to Congress-this time in the form of cases from other jurisdictions
that had upheld forum selection clauses under section 3(8) of the Hague
Rules.' 60 Thus, although delegates to the Brussels Convention and COGSA
were confronted with the issue, both groups chose to avoid adding sections
specifically affecting jurisdictional clauses.1 6 1
Although concurring and agreeing with the two fundamental holdings
of the majority, Justice O'Connor would have limited the holding in Sky
Reefer to clauses that dealt only with arbitration. Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that the assumption that the transaction costs of litigating in a for-
eign forum automatically lessen liability is, without more, flawed, and that
the decision of the district court to retain jurisdiction in order to enforce
the arbitral award was sufficient to insure that the arbitrator's decision did
not run afoul of COGSA. 16 2 However,Justice O'Connor would have limited
the Court's reasoning to arbitration clauses in bills of lading due to several
158. Comit( Maritime International, London Conference, October 1922, at 411 (Bul-
letin no. 57), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 421.
159. See Sturley, supra note 157, at 38 and n.300 (citing S. 427, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3 (1923)). Several versions of McKellar-Nelson Bills were introduced to both houses of
Congress each year from 1912 to 1923. See 1 LEGIsLAmIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 16-
17 (the McKellar-Nelson Bills, in particular, contained clauses that would have struck
foreign jurisdiction clauses found in bills of lading). In 1923, Representative Edmonds
introduced a similar bill, known as the 1923 Bill, which was not passed. See id. at 17.
Edmonds reintroduced the bill with minor changes the next year. See id. (1924 House
Bill). Senator McNary introduced a bill in 1924 similar to the McKellar-Nelson Bills. See
id. at 18 (1924 Senate Bill). After being referred to committees, both bills were killed.
See id. Edmonds introduced two bills in 1925; Congress passed neither. See id. at 18-
19. Representative White and Senator Jones introduced similar bills in 1928, in their
respective houses. The bills were not passed. See id. at 19-20. In 1929 and 1930, Con-
gressman White (by 1930 a Senator) introduced compromise versions of the bills. See
id. at 20-21. Senator White introduced bills in each new session of Congress until 1935,
when the White Bill was passed, thereby adopting the U.S. version of the Hague Rules-
COGSA. See id. at 21-23.
160. See The Carriage of Goods by Sea: Hearing on S. 1152 Before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, 74th Cong., 85, 87 (1935), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIW HISroRY, supra note
16, at 587-589 (in particular Maharani Mills v. Anchor Line, 29 Lloyd's List L. Rep 169
(Eng. C.A. 1927); The Media, 41 Lloyd's List L. Rep 80 (Eng. K.B. 1931)).
161. Michael Sturley, the preeminent scholar on the history of the Hague Rules and
COGSA, pointed out in his amicus brief on behalf of carrier interests in Shy Reefer that
section 3(8) was designed to establish a carrier's substantive rights and responsibilities,
not to affect procedural matters. See Brief Amicus Curiae at 17, Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct.
2322 (No. 94-623). Professor Sturley was cited favorably by the majority in several
instances. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327, 2328.
162. See id. at 2330 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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factors: historical concerns that foreign forum choice clauses oust the
courts of jurisdiction; the fact that the decision in Indussa was well estab-
lished; and the consistent invalidation of foreign forum choice clauses by
the lower courts. 163
Justice Stevens authored a scathing dissent based on the historical
nature of the maritime economy, the Indussa line of cases, and a broad
interpretation of COGSA in relation to the FAA.164 The maritime market
was historically controlled by carrier interests, and "[b]ecause a bill of lad-
ing was (and is) a contract of adhesion, which a shipper must accept or else
find another means to transport his goods, shippers were in no position to
bargain around [the exculpatory] clauses [contained in bills of lading]." 165
Justice Stevens would have employed either the Harter Act, which still
applies in areas outside the scope of COGSA, 16 6 or COGSA to preclude all
foreign forum choice clauses.' 67 Citing the myriad support by cases and
commentators, Justice Stevens applied the "high hurdle" reasoning of the
Indussa court, including that court's consideration of the transactional
costs incurred in seeking to establish liability.16 8 Justice Stevens also
appealed to the application of stare decisis based on the fact that Sky Reefer
dealt with commercial matters that were "well understood and... accepted
for long periods of time." 16 9
163. See id. at 2330-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. See id. at 2331-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2331 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cites Liver-
pool & G.S. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889), for support. In Liverpool
& G.S. Steam, the Court stated:
The carrier and his customer do not stand upon a footing of equality. The indi-
vidual customer has no real freedom of choice. He cannot afford to higgle [sic]
or stand out, and seek redress in the courts. He prefers rather to accept any bill
of lading, or to sign any paper, that the carrier presents; and in most cases he
has no alternative but to do this, or to abandon his business.
Id. at 441.
166. The Harter Act contains the following language:
[1]t shall not be lawful for the ... owner of any vessel transporting merchandise
... from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to insert in any
bill of lading ... any clause.., whereby it... shall be relieved from liability for
loss or damage .... Any and all words or clauses of such import... shall be null
and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1995) (emphasis added). The Harter Act provisions still apply in
transport "between ports of the United States," i.e., domestic transport. However,
regarding transport "to or from ports of the United States," i.e., foreign transport,
COGSA sets forth the binding law. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300. Justice Stevens found the
language of the Harter Act compelling because the Supreme Court had previously used
that language to overturn a foreign choice of law clause in a bill of lading. See Sky Reefer,
115 S. Ct. at 2331-32 (citing Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69, 77 (1900)).
167. See Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
168. See id. at 2333. Not only did justice Stevens take into account the costs of arbi-
trating in a foreign tribunal, but he also included the cost of having law other than
COGSA applied, the cost of settlements due in large part to the increased costs of arbi-
trating in a foreign tribunal, the costs associated with an unequal amount of market
power manifesting itself in the form of decreased value and negotiability of the bill of
lading, and the costs accompanying review of foreign arbitral awards. See id
169. Id. at 2334.
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IV. Post-Sky Reefer
A. Economics
The text and history of COGSA section 3(8) support the Supreme Court's
opinion in Sky Reefer. In passing COGSA, Congress was specifically con-
fronted with the issue of forum selection clauses. The fact that the legisla-
ture subsequently refused to specifically discuss such clauses in the Act
creates a strong presumption that the clauses were not to be covered by the
Act. The Supreme Court's opinion promotes the goal of international uni-
formity envisaged by the drafters of the Hague Rules (codified in the
United States as COGSA) and the New York Convention (codified in the
United States as the FAA). The ramifications of the ruling are still unclear,
however. Without a doubt, arbitration clauses in bills of lading covering
the transport of goods to or from U.S. ports are now enforceable. In
Kanematsu Corp. v. M/V Gretchen W,170 the district court relied on Sky
Reefer to enforce a foreign arbitration clause contained in a bill of lad-
ing.1 71 The implications for foreign forum choice clauses are less clear.
Although the strength of the Court's reasoning applies equally to
forum choice clauses, the reasoning in regard to those clauses is merely
dicta. The issue presented to the Sky Reefer Court was only that of the
enforceability of a foreign arbitration agreement.1 72 The Court's dicta,
however, is quite compelling, 173 and further invalidation of forum choice
clauses under the Indussa doctrine appears improbable. 174 Keeping in
170. 897 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Ore. 1995).
171. Judge Robert E. Jones stated, "[W]hen a party brings suit for damaged goods
under the terms of a bill of lading, that party consents to all of the conditions of the bill
of lading." Id. at 1317.
172. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326 (1995).
173. With only Justices O'Connor and Stevens refusing to join the majority opinion,
in order to prevent the Court from overturning Indussa, two Justices from the majority
would have to change their votes and Justice Breyer would have to join a dissent. This
scenario of course assumes that Justice O'Connor would join the dissent (a high
probability given her Sky Reefer concurrence). Given the text of the statute, it is unlikely
that either Justice Thomas or Scalia would abdicate. The strong legislative history in
support of the text would appear to keep Justice Rehnquist in the majority. With only
the author, Justice Kennedy, and Justices Ginsburg and Souter remaining, the dissent
would need Justices Ginsburg and Souter to change their support for the reasoning
behind Sky Reefer in order to uphold Indussa.
174. Several district courts have enforced foreign forum choice clauses found in bills
of lading in the wake of Sky Reefer. In G.A. Pasztory v. Croatia Line, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia discussed the application of Sky Reefer in this context at
length. 918 F. Supp. 961, 966-68, 1996 A.M.C. 1189 (E.D. Va. 1996) (Croatian forum
selection clause). The court initially adopted Sky Reefer's reasoning with respect to
Indussa's "high hurdle" analysis and held that section 3(8) of COGSA did not invalidate
a foreign forum selection per se. See id. Secondly, the court, placing the burden of proof
on the cargo plaintiff, held that there was no proof that the law applicable in Croatia
would act to lessen the liability of the carrier based on the substantive content of the
applicable law. See id. at 966-67. It is important to note that this case was dismissed in
favor of the Croatian forum, effectively preventing future review by American courts in
order to insure the application of important American public policy as embodied in
COGSA. See id. at 968; Sky Reefer, 115 S.Ct. at 2330. Although this distinction was
noted, the court held that Sky Reefer had established that foreign forum selection clauses
were presumptively enforceable absent proof that the substantive law that would be
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mind the historical reasons for the passage of COGSA, 175 particularly the
inequality of bargaining power in favor of carriers and the subsequent use
of that power to limit liability, the economic rationale for Sky Reefer is
questionable. However, the further application of that reasoning in order
to overturn the Indussa doctrine appears inevitable.
The shipping industry is basically composed of two markets, tramp
shipping and liner/tanker shipping.17 6 The tramp shipping market is com-
posed of a large number of small shippers and a large number of small
carriers.177 This characteristic tends to allow for free competition among
the competitors, and bargaining power is therefore relatively equal. 178
Under these conditions, a shipper should be capable of negotiating for the
contract of carriage he desires. Under these freely negotiated contracts, the
shipper is able to assess his costs, both real and potential, prior to con-
tracting. If confronted with a foreign arbitration or forum clause, the ship-
per will seek compensation for this additional cost in the form of price or
non-price concessions from the carrier. Alternatively, given these market
conditions, he may go to another tramper in order to ship his goods, thus
avoiding the potential costs of arbitration at the same shipping rates or
paying lower shipping rates in recognition of the potential costs of arbitra-
tion. In circumstances such as these, a shipper is confronted with all costs
and a jurisdictional clause in the bill of lading may not act to lessen the
shipper's potential recovery. 1 79
In the liner market, however, the shipper is confronted with oligopolis-
tic power. These markets are controlled by one or a few large carriers, who
may control from seventy to eighty percent of the total liner tonnage.180
Unlike the tramp shipping market, liner firms have regular, scheduled ser-
vice to and from certain ports. 181 Each firm in the oligopolistic market,
due to its relative market power, may charge prices that will maximize their
applied by the selected tribunal would be "less than what COGSA guarantees." See G.A.
Pasztory, 918 F. Supp. at 966. Other courts have enforced foreign forum selection
clauses almost without discussion. See, e.g., Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) v. M/V Mira, No.
CIV.A.95-4224, 1996 WL 444193 (E.D. La. Aug. 7, 1996) (enforcing London, England
forum choice clause); Fireman's Fund Ins. v. M/V DSR Atlantic, 1996 A.M.C. 878 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (Korean forum choice clause).
175. The historical background of COGSA is discussed supra Part I.
176. See IGNAcY CHRZANOWSICI, AN INTRODUCnON TO SHIPPING ECONOMics 56-61 (SJ.
Wiater ed., 1985). This Note discusses the impact of Sky Reefer on the segment of the
market known as "for hire carriage." In this public market, individuals with goods to
ship interact with vessel owners to contract for the carriage of their goods. A third seg-
ment of the shipping market consists of private firms with their own fleet of ships which
are used to ship their own freight. This aspect of the shipping market is not affected by
Sky Reefer. See Interview with Jon L. Smith, Chairman, Department of Economics and
Finance, East Tennessee State University, Feb. 18, 1996.
177. See CHRzANowsKi, supra note 176, at 56-57.
178. See id. at 56.
179. To the extent that the contract is embodied in a bill of lading, the shipper is still
protected by the responsibilities imposed on the carrier by COGSA. See Yancey, supra
note 17, at 1243.
180. See CHRzANowsKu, supra note 176, at 59.
181. See Interview with Jon L. Smith, supra note 176.
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economic profits, using price discrimination' 8 2 or some variant thereof, to
do so.1 83
A December 1995 report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
details the ability of carriers in liner markets to act collusively in order to
increase freight rates above the level that would predominate in a competi-
tive market.184 Ocean carriers may enter into collusive price fixing agree-
ments with antitrust immunity.' 85 However, the effectiveness of liner
conferences, or any collusive arrangement, depends upon the ability of the
colluding group to "identify and punish defection from the collusive out-
come, and ... prevent entry [into the market]." 186 Furthermore, although
entry into the liner market is relatively easy' 8 7-a factor that normally lim-
its the effectiveness of collusive behavior-the policing of members is per-
formed at no extra cost to the group, thereby allowing for a more cohesive
cartel. 188
Under the Shipping Act of 1916,189 all carriers and conferences1 90 are
required to file their rates with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC).
The FMC is authorized to fine any carrier who illegally discounts from the
filed rates.' 91 Thus, the existence of the filing and enforcement provisions
of the Shipping Act of 1916 allows carriers to more easily collude and
extract supracompetitive profits from the market. Because carriers are
allowed to charge different rates based on the type and volume of cargo
being shipped, this tariff filing scheme does not prevent price discrimina-
tion.192 Thus, large shippers with market power are allowed to extract con-
cessions from the carriers in the form of marginally cheaper shipping
rates.
19 3
The power of carriers, however, does not end at the ability to price
discriminate. The FTC report concludes, "an increase in market concentra-
182. For the purposes of this Note, price discrimination is defined as the sale of a
service at more than one price to different buyers. For a more complete discussion of
price discrimination in markets characterized by sellers with monopoly or market
power, see DOUGLAS F. GREER, INDUSrIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 437-438 (3d
ed. 1992).
183. See CHRZANOWSIU, supra note 176, at 58. This market power is not absolute,
however. Large shippers of goods may have some countervailing market power that will
tend to limit the ability of carriers to completely recover monopoly profits from the
market. See Paul S. Clyde & James D. Reitzes, The Effectiveness of Collusion Under Anti-
trust Immunity, in STAFF REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 5 (Dec. 1995).
184. See Clyde & Reitzes, supra note 183, at 2-3.
185. See id. at 4.
186. Id. at 2.
187. See id. at 5.
188. For a more complete discussion of the policing of liner conferences see infra
notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
189. Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1984).
190. A liner conference is a group of carriers who have agreed upon the price that
they will charge to ship goods. See Clyde & Reitzes, supra note 183, at 4.
191. See 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1984).
192. See Clyde & Reitzes, supra note 183, at 13.
193. See id. at 5 n.8.
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tion is associated with increased freight rates."194 These findings show
two things. First, carriers possess market power. Second, the ability to
price discriminate exists. Sky Reefer allows carriers to go one step further
by allowing for non-price discrimination. A relatively simple hypothetical
illustrates this implication of Sky Reefer.
Assuming that the rates charged for shipping an amount of cargo are
proportional to the amount of cargo shipped (i.e., rates are the same for all
cargo regardless of type or volume), 195 a shipper, large or small, in the
liner market will be charged marginally equal rates regardless of the size of
the shipment. If shipper A transports two tons of cargo at $2000 per ton,
the total cost of shipment is $4000. Suppose further that shipper B trans-
ports sixty tons of cargo at $2000 per ton for a total cost of shipment of
$120,000. Due to the market power of the carrier, neither party is able to
freely negotiate its bill of lading, which contains a foreign arbitration
clause. In transit from Taiwan to San Francisco, the carrier negligently
damages $1000 worth of A's and $1000 worth of B's goods.
Though all things appear to be equal, the ability of the carrier to price
discriminate over non-price terms is preserved. Prior to Sky Reefer, the
expected return from pursuing the two claims would have been equal, 196
and the incentive would have existed to do so up until the point that the
cost of litigating in the American court equaled the value of the expected
recovery, $1000. After Sky Reefer, however, both shippers will be forced to
pursue their claim through foreign arbitration. The enforcement of the
arbitration clause creates two problems.
Initially, the cost of pursuing the claim through foreign arbitration
may be higher than U.S. court litigation. If foreign arbitration is indeed
more expensive than domestic litigation, then the two shippers are con-
fronted with costs that they would not have faced in a free market-costs
they could have avoided were they capable of negotiating a bill of lading
without an arbitration agreement. The imposition of these additional costs
decreases their expected return by the amount of the increase in costs due
to the arbitration clause.
The second problem that may confront the shippers is the application
of a law other than COGSA, thus decreasing their expected returns due to
the potential for a smaller recovery. Yet even in these circumstances the
two shippers are treated equally. Further, because arbitration is generally
less expensive than litigation,197 the problem of decreased expected
194. Id. at 34. The researchers go on to conclude that "increases in market concentra-
tion are associated with statistically significant, but economically small, increases in
freight rates." Id. at 3.
195. A characteristic that does not exist in the liner market. See id. at 13. This
assumption merely allows the author to isolate the effect of the arbitration clause on the
shipper's costs. Without the assumption, the differences in costs would be more pro-
nounced because of legal volume discounts to high volume shippers.
196. Assuming negligence and a proper application of law, a carrier could not have
lessened his liability substantively based on section 3(8) of COGSA.
197. Although the relative costs of litigation versus arbitration have been debated fre-
quently, most attorneys believe that arbitration is less expensive than litigation, even in
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 30
returns due to higher costs is diminished. Moreover, since many nations
have codified domestic Hague Rules, 198 the chance that a carrier will be
able to exculpate or otherwise limit its liability based merely on jurisdic-
tion is limited. Here again, however, the two shippers are treated
equally.199 Problems of disparate treatment arise when a carrier strategi-
cally enforces the forum selection clause in its bill of lading.
Sky Reefer preserves the ability of carriers to non-price discriminate
based on the terms of the bill of lading through strategic enforcement of
forum selection clauses. Because shipper B transports more cargo more
often than shipper A, his business is more valuable to the carrier. If ship-
per B files suit in an American court, the carrier can refuse to seek enforce-
ment of the arbitration clause, litigate in an American tribunal, and thus
ensure shipper B's expected return. Due to the marginal value of shipper A
to the carrier, if suit is filed in an American court, the carrier will move to
compel arbitration. 200 Due to the decrease in expected return accompa-
nied by this change, the incentive to settle is increased and the claim may
be discharged for less than what it would have been worth if litigated in a
U.S. court.20 1 In this manner, shipper A's cost of doing business with the
carrier is increased marginally over shipper B's cost, due to the diminished
expected return on A's claim.202
foreign arbitrations. See Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (Feb.
1985).
198. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
199. Assuming the costs of litigating in a foreign tribunal are at least equal to, if not
greater than, the costs of domestic litigation and/or foreign arbitration, the concerns in
the accompanying text are only magnified if Sky Reefer can in fact be read to overrule
Indussa.
200. In North River Ins. Co. v. Federal Commerce and Navigation Co., Ltd., the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC) found a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 812 when a carrier had
enforced a forum clause in its bill of lading against some shippers and not against
others. 1983 A.M.C. 2500, 2501. The FMC based its holding on the language of § 812,
which prohibited the discriminatory settlement of claims by shippers. See id. at 2505-
07. Although 46 U.S.C. § 812 was repealed effective September 30, 1996 (Act of Dec.
29, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 335(b), 109 Stat. 953), the Shipping Act of 1984 outlaws
similar conduct. See 46 U.S.C. § 1709(e) (1984). See also Robert Mottley, Beware of
Foreign Arbitration, A. SHIPPER, March 1996 at 52.
201. This discrimination has been found to exist in the market. One anonymous
practitioner described small to medium claims as "Sky Reefer bait." In order to keep
large shippers happy, claims are litigated domestically. Arbitration is threatened in
small to medium claims in the hopes of achieving settlements below their true value.
The attorney went on to state that many of the claims had been settled for half their
actual value. Several participants in the shipping market share this view. Paul S.
Edelman, a partner at Kreindler & Kreindler, projects "tremendous repercussions" from
the Sky Reefer decision; David W. Martowski, president of Transport Mutual Services,
Inc., predicts increased settlements; Donald J. Bilski, manager of subrogation at Royal
Insurance, a cargo insurer, forecasts slow claim resolution, costing "the American econ-
omy billions of dollars." See Dominic Benciverga, Foreign Jurisdiction; Court Ships Cargo
Arbitration Actions Overseas, N.Y.LJ., July 6, 1995, at 5.
202. Other commentators have forecast similar effects of Sky Reefer. See Charles M.
Davis, Sky Reefer: Foreign Arbitration & Litigation Under COGSA, 8 U.S.F. MAR. UJ. 73,
88-90 (1995); C. Christine Fahrenback, Note, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky
Reefer: A Change in Course: COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in
Maritime, 29 AKRON L. REv. 371, 372 n.10, 390-95 (1996); Stuart C. Gauffreau, Note,
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B. Statutory Proposals
Given the present lack of uniformity in the rules governing the carriage of
goods by sea 203 and the express intent of the framers of the Hague Rules to
avoid placing procedural rules within the purview of an international
agreement,20 4 it becomes the province of national law whether to enforce
forum choice clauses found in bills of lading.205 With these facts in mind,
the Maritime Law Association of the United States has proposed significant
changes to the United States COGSA. 20 6 The proposed changes represent
a compromise between cargo and carrier interests in the United States,20 7
just as the Hague Rules represented a compromise between cargo and car-
rier internationally. 20 8 The compromise embodied in the proposal is so
fragile that the committee states:
[T]he bill does not represent a series of proposed changes in the law.
Rather, the overall compromise must be taken as a whole, for individual
sections of the bill are acceptable to specific segments of the industry only
because they are balanced by other changes to the law found elsewhere in
the proposed legislation.209
Section 3(8)(b) of the proposed legislation specifically addresses the issue
of forum selection arrangements. 210
Although one commentator has articulated a different approach,211
the rule proposed by the Maritime Law Association is based on a compro-
mise by both cargo and carrier and therefore represents the best manner in
which to deal with the forum selection issue. The proposed rule states:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement made before a claim has arisen that spec-
ifies a foreign forum for litigation or arbitration of a dispute governed by this
Act shall be null and void and of no effect if:
(i) the port of loading or the port of discharge is or was intended to be
in the United States; or
Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: The Supreme Court's Decision in
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 20 N.CJ. Ir'L L. & COM. REG. 395, 411-
18 (1996); Christine N. Schnarr, Note, Foreign Forum Selection Clauses Under COGSA:
The Supreme Court Charts New Waters in the Sky Reefer Case, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 867, 877
(1996).
203. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 157-58 and accompanying text.
205. Revising COGSA, supra note 44, at 31.
206. Id. at 10.
207. Id. at 9-10.
208. Revising the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: Final Report of the Ad Hoc Liability
Rules Study Group as Revised by the Ad Hoc Review Committee 1 (Feb. 9, 1995)
(unpublished proposal of the MLA, on file with Michael F. Sturley, University of Texas
Law School).
209. Revising COGSA, supra note 44, at 10. The committee describes the compromise
as "better than any other alternative that is reasonably likely to be enacted in this coun-
try." Id. at 11.
210. See id. at 31.
211. See Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After
Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. Rav. 55, 106 (1992)
(proposing statute to enforce "forum agreements in which the aggregate consideration
for the transaction" is greater than $50,000).
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(ii) the place where the goods are received by a carrier or the place
where the goods are delivered to a person authorized to receive them is
or was intended to be in the United States;
provided, however, that if a clause, covenant, or agreement made before a
claim has arisen specifies a foreign forum for arbitration of a dispute gov-
emed by this Act, then a court, on the timely motion of either party, shall
order that arbitration shall proceed in the United States. 2 12
According to the subcommittee that drafted the proposed legislation, the
bill would invalidate any foreign forum choice clause or foreign arbitration
clause if the goods covered by the bill were or were intended to be loaded or
discharged in a U.S. port or if the carrier received or delivered the goods in
the United States. 2 13 The drafters of the legislation did, however, provide
parties who had agreed to foreign arbitration the ability to request and
proceed to arbitration in the United States. 2 1
4
After a dispute has arisen in U.S. courts, either party may make a
timely request to submit the dispute to domestic arbitration based on the
existence of a foreign arbitration clause in the bill of lading.2 15 The draft-
ers do note that this legislation might force a party into domestic arbitra-
tion who might not have agreed to it otherwise, but go on to state that "the
alternative is to deprive parties of arbitration entirely."2 16 This provision
will have two effects. A plaintiff, usually the shipper, who has sought
domestic arbitration but resisted foreign arbitration, may file suit in the
United States and then request that the court order arbitration in the
United States. Thus, cargo avoids what may have constituted an adhesive
foreign arbitration agreement yet is not entirely deprived of the arbitral
forum. The defendant, on the other hand, is not forced into court and may
avoid domestic arbitration altogether by carefully drafting the arbitration
clause in his bills of lading. 2 17 More troublesome, however, is when the
212. Revising COGSA, supra note 44, app. 1 at 51 (emphasis in original).
213. See id. at 31. If, however, the only basis for jurisdiction within the United States
is the ability to exercise jurisdiction over the ship, then the validity of the clauses would
be determined by general maritime law. See id. Thus, if a plaintiff cannot obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant in the United States, then section 3(8)(b) will not
govern. See id.
214. Id. at 31.
215. See id. If neither party requests the submission of the dispute to arbitration,
then the suit may continue in the district court "as if there had been no arbitration
clause." See id.
216. Id. at 32.
217. See id. at 31-32. Although the committee claims that the language of the statute
will allow for a foreign arbitration clause to be drafted specifically enough to allow a
party who is unwilling to arbitrate in the United States that freedom, the language of the
statute does not support that reading. According to the statute, "[I]f a clause... speci-
fies a foreign forum for arbitration of a dispute... then a court, on the timely motion of
either party, shall order that arbitration shall proceed in the United States." Id. at app. 1
at 51 (emphasis added). The proposed legislation gives the court no discretion: it
merely requires an arbitration clause specifying a foreign forum and timely motion by a
party.
To that end, a carrier would not be able to place a clause avoiding domestic arbitration
in a bill of lading. As soon as a carrier specifies foreign arbitration, the clause is either
void or, upon timely motion by either party, enforceable only in the United States. In
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plaintiff has sought to avoid arbitration entirely.
A defendant is in a position to force an arbitration-adverse plaintiff
into U.S.-based arbitration under the present form of the proposed legisla-
tion. Bills of lading are adhesive agreements. 218 Because cargo plaintiffs,
particularly in the liner market, are unable to bargain over bill of lading
terms, their willingness to assent to arbitration is difficult to presume. By
allowing the defendant to move for arbitration and requiring the court to
order the dispute submitted to domestic arbitration, the plaintiff is
deprived of his ability to file suit in a domestic court. Arguably, this plain-
tiff is not injured. He may still pursue his claim domestically, thereby
avoiding what some feel are the increased costs associated with foreign
arbitration.219 At the same time, the plaintiff gets the benefit of exper-
ienced American admiralty arbitrators applying the United States COGSA.
Even though the grounds for setting aside an arbitral award due to a mis-
take of law are still limited, the probability that the law will be applied
incorrectly is presumably narrow due to the experience of American arbi-
trators, and limitations on the plaintiffs recovery are therefore also
confined.
The proposed legislation specifically addresses the issue of foreign
forum choice agreements and works to provide "greater protection for
cargo interests" than under Sky Reefer.220 Under the proposal a cargo
plaintiff could avoid foreign litigation or arbitration while being guaranteed
the option of domestic litigation or arbitration. Although a plaintiff may be
forced to arbitrate domestically, a forum he would not have agreed to in a
competitive market, he is still protected from the added costs some have
associated with foreign arbitration. The proposal, in fact, goes farther than
its framers intended because it limits the ability of a carrier defendant to
draft a forum clause that would avoid litigation in a United States forum
under all circumstances. Contractual problems with the proposal do exist
as a party that never assented to arbitration may be forced to arbitrate.
Nonetheless, the compromise characteristics of the entire piece of legisla-
tion hasten against questioning the committee's rationale.
Conclusion
The Hague Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act were passed in
order to redress the inequality of bargaining power between cargo and car-
rier in the shipping market.221 These laws prevented a carrier from limit-
order to allow for drafting around this provision, the legislation would need to state,
"that if a clause... specifies a foreign forum for arbitration of a dispute governed by this
Act, and does not expressly exclude arbitration in the United States, then a court, on the
timely motion of either party, shall order .... (emphasized terminology represents
additions to the proposed legislation).
218. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
219. The Sky Reefer Court felt that there were no increased costs. See supra notes 142-
43 and accompanying text. The Indussa court thought the costs high enough to deter
cargo from the pursuit of its claim. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
220. See Revising COGSA, supra note 44, at 31.
221. See GiLMoRE & BLAcK, supra note 3, § 3-25, at 14547.
Cornell International Law Journal
ing his liability to a shipper through clauses found in a bill of lading. 22 2
Although lower federal courts had ruled that forum choice clauses violated
the intent of COGSA, in Sky Reefer the Supreme Court upheld a forum
choice clause calling for foreign arbitration. The Court's reasoning eroded
the very foundation supporting Indussa's per se invalidation of foreign liti-
gation clauses found in bills of lading. In a perfectly competitive market,
the costs of these clauses could be avoided by the shipper, but the market
power of carriers prevents shippers from avoiding these costs. This allows
shippers to discriminate over non-price terms, limiting the ability of
smaller shippers to compete in the market for carriage.
Although the shipping market normally reacts very slowly to changes,
the impact of Sky Reefer has already been felt. Carrier attorneys are able to
settle claims for less than if they had been litigated in American courts
under the umbrella of COGSA. The Maritime Law Association of the
United States has acted to cure this market inequity by proposing legisla-
tion striking foreign jurisdiction clauses of all types. Only if these propos-
als are adopted can the balance of power be restored to the shipping
industry, curing the inequities of Sky Reefer and fulfilling the promise of
COGSA.
222. See id.
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